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The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Today: The Demands 
of the Fourth Amendment, Nix, and Murray, and the 
Disagreement Among the Federal Circuits · 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS 
This comment explores the most recently developed exception to the 
exclusionary rule-the inevitable discovery doctrine. Before discussing 
this exception, it will be helpful to briefly explain the exclusionary rule. 
The judiciary created exclusionary rule prohibits the state from using evi-
dence obtained through police misconduct. Police misconduct includes 
the violation of a criminal defendant's Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment 
rights. Generally, the exclusionary rule operates by excluding all illegally 
obtained evidence from being introduced in a criminal trial, whether ob-
tained directly (primary evidence) or indirectly (derivative evidence) 
from the police misconduct. The distinction between primary and deriva-
tive evidence can be dispositive in determining whether an exception to 
the exclusionary rule will be applied, depending on the jurisdiction and 
the situation presented. 1 
The rationale behind the exclusionary rule is deterrence: if the gov-
ernment knows it will not be able to use evidence gained in violation of a 
defendant's rights, it will be less likely to violate those rights. But while 
the rule is quite effective in punishing police misconduct, it has a high 
cost to society. It lets the guilty go unpunished merely because the police 
blundered. For nearly seventy-five years the Supreme Court did not apply 
the exclusionary rule to the states. In 1961, however, the Supreme Court, 
under the theory of incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment, did just 
that.Z Since then the rule has been subject to a great deal of criticism. 
Much of the criticism comes from state law enforcement; however, some 
of the most disparaging attacks on this judge-made doctrine have come 
from newer members of the Supreme Court. As more justices have rec-
ognized the rule's unpopularity and its "high social costs of letting per-
sons obviously guilty go unpunished for their crimes,"3 the Supreme 
Court has carved out some exceptions to the exclusionary rule. These ex-
• Copyright © 1998 by Troy E. Golden. 
I . See infra Part Ill. 
2. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
3. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). 
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ceptions are generally appropriate in situations where application of the 
exclusionary rule would fail to achieve its deterrence purpose. 
The first exception the Court developed is the independent source 
doctrine. This exception permits the introduction of evidence in a crimi-
nal prosecution, despite the fact it was initially discovered during or as a 
consequence of police misconduct, provided the state can prove that the 
evidence was later obtained from independent lawful activities untainted 
by the initial illegality. For example, where an unlawful warrantless 
search has given the police knowledge of facts A, B, and C, but fact C has 
also been learned by other means, fact C can be admissible at trial be-
cause it was derived from an independent source. Suppressing fact C un-
der the exclusionary rule would be unfair to the state because that would 
go beyond the rule's deterrent purpose: "When the challenged evidence 
has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the po-
lice in a worse position than they would have been absent any error or vio-
lation."4 
Attenuation of the taint is a second exception to the exclusionary 
rule. This exception keeps certain evidence from being suppressed if the 
state can prove that the tainted quality of the evidence was sufficiently 
purged by attenuation, or distance, between the evidence and the miscon-
duct from which it was derived. In a sense, this exception is the criminal 
procedure version of the tort doctrine of proximate cause. The Court in 
Wong Sun v. United States5 established this exception's test to be 
"whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to 
which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that 
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of 
primary taint."6 An intervening act of free will is a good example of at-
tenuation sufficient to break the causal chain between the evidence and 
police misconduct. In Wong Sun, the Court found that the fact that the 
defendant was released on his own recognizance after an illegal arrest, 
but later returned to the station to confess, removed any taint from the 
confession. 
The third and most recent exception to the exclusionary rule--the in-
evitable discovery doctrine--is best understood as "an extrapolation from 
the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be ad-
missible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be 
admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered."7 Thus, the inevi-
4. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1987) (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 443). 
5. 37 I U.S. 47 I (1963). 
6. !d. at 488. 
7. Murray, 487 U.S. at 539 (italics removed). 
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table discovery doctrine is like a speculative or hypothetical version of 
the independent source doctrine. 
This comment begins its analysis of the inevitable discovery doctrine 
by reviewing the Robert Anthony Williams cases, where the Supreme 
Court suggested and then adopted the doctrine. The comment then ex-
plains two interrelated areas in which lower courts have conflicted with 
each other and, arguably, interpreted the doctrine beyond the original in-
tention of the Court. This split in the lower courts includes decisions 
which expanded, as well as refused to expand, the doctrine's application 
to: ( 1) admit primary evidence, and (2) avoid the warrant requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment. The comment reviews each of these two expan-
sions separately and stresses their erosive effects on the exclusionary rule 
and the Fourth Amendment. A brief explanation of the active pursuit doc-
trine, a requirement which attempts to solve the erosion problem caused 
by the aforementioned expansions, follows. Lastly, the comment con-
cludes with an examination of the need for the Supreme Court to unify 
the lower courts and expressly adopt certain limitations to the inevitable 
discovery doctrine. 
II. ADOPTION OF THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE: 
THE WILLIAMS CASES 
The Supreme Court adopted the inevitable discovery exception when 
dealing with the monstrous crime of Robert Anthony Williams, a suppos-
edly religious man who had kidnapped and murdered a ten-year-old girl 
on Christmas Eve, 1968. The controversy of the Williams cases stems 
from the admission of certain incriminating statements, made as a result 
of police misconduct, in Williams' 1969 trial. The misconduct consisted 
of an unlawful conversation between a police officer, Detective Learning, 
and Williams, during which Williams' attorney was not present even 
though Williams had been arraigned and had retained counsel by that 
time. In this conversation, popularly known as the "Christian burial 
speech," Detective Learning played to Williams' religious sympathies by 
pleading with him to reveal the body's location, in light of an imminent 
snowstorm, so her parents could have closure and provide the girl a 
proper burial as soon as possible. Learning was successful in obtaining 
the information he sought from Williams and subsequently found the vic-
tim's body because of that information. 
At trial, Williams argued that the exclusionary rule should preclude 
the jury from learning of the incriminating statements obtained as a result 
of the Christian burial speech. Though the trial judge was not convinced 
of the need to suppress that evidence, Williams' argument eventually pre-
vailed before the United States Supreme Court in his habeas corpus ap-
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peal, Brewer v. Williams. 8 In Brewer, the Court held that the evidence in 
question had been improperly admitted at trial because it had violated Wil-
liams' Sixth Amendment right to counsel. It is important to note that the 
Court was closely divided in its ruling and that the ruling was met with a 
great deal of unpopularity, many naturally believing that Robert Anthony 
Williams should be brought to justice. Not surprisingly, the holding in 
Brewer incited further debate and controversy over the societal cost and 
effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. 
For those who demanded a conviction, if there was a saving grace to 
the Brewer Court's action, it was found in the opinion's twelfth footnote. 
The footnote indicated that although the exclusionary rule precluded Wil-
liams' incriminating statements from being introduced into evidence at a 
second trial, evidence of the body's location and condition "might well be 
admissible on the theory that the body would have been discovered in any 
event, even had incriminating statements not been elicited from Wil-
liams."9 In fact, at the time Williams' unlawfully obtained statement led 
the police to the culvert ditch which contained the victim's body, there 
was an ongoing independent search (unaware of Williams assistance) no 
more than two and a half miles from the ditch. Arguably, this independent 
search party would have inevitably found the body without Williams' 
help. Thus, the footnote in Brewer paved the way for the adoption of the 
inevitable discovery exception; later, in Nix v. Williams, 10 the Supreme 
Court affirmed the admission of evidence of the body's location and con-
dition in Williams' second trial conviction. The Nix court found that there 
was sufficient evidence that the independent ongoing search would have 
inevitably discovered the body, regardless of the Christian burial speech. 
The Nix ruling marked the Supreme Court's official adoption of the inevi-
table discovery exception. 
The Court's adoption of the inevitable discovery exception represents 
a recognition that society's interest in punishing criminals should not be 
less important than its interest in deterring police misconduct. The Court 
realized that without the inevitable discovery exception there would be 
certain situations (like the Robert Anthony Williams case) when the 
exclusionary rule would do society a disservice, unfairly tipping the bal-
ance of interests in favor of setting an acknowledged criminal free. Adop-
tion of the inevitable discovery exception seeks to fairly balance the 
scales of justice. That is, "the interest of society in deterring police mis-
conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evi-
dence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, 
8 430 U.S. 387 ( 1977). 
9. !d. at 407 n.l2. 
10. 467 U.S. 431 (1984) 
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not a worse, position than they would have been in if no police error or 
misconduct had occurred." 11 The Court reasoned that since the rationale 
behind the exclusionary rule is that "the prosecution is not to be in a 
better position than it would have been in if no illegality had tran-
spired,"12 it follows that "if the prosecution can establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would 
have been discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence rationale 
has so little basis that the evidence should be received. Anything less 
would reject logic, experience, and common sense."13 
During argument of the Nix case, the Court was asked to impose a 
requirement, in addition to the requirement of proving inevitability, that 
the state must also prove absence of bad faith before the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine could be utilized. The reasoning behind this proposed 
limitation was "that if an absence-of-bad-faith requirement was not im-
posed, the temptation to risk deliberate violations of the [defendant's con-
stitutional rights] would be too great, and the deterrence effect of the 
Exclusionary Rule reduced too far." 14 However, the majority of the Court 
flatly rejected this good faith requirement, seeing it as unnecessary, and 
reasoned that "[a] police officer who is faced with the opportunity to ob-
tain evidence illegally will rarely, if ever, be in a position to calculate 
whether the evidence sought would inevitably be discovered;"15 and, even 
if an officer were in such a position, "he will try to avoid engaging in any 
questionable practice ... [because i]n that situation there will be little to 
gain from any dubious 'shortcuts' to obtain the evidence." 16 Again, with 
the concern that society's interest in justice not be given less weight than 
the rights of criminal defendants, something the inevitable discovery ex-
ception has come to stand for, the Court concluded that "the societal costs 
of the exclusionary rule far outweigh any possible benefits to deterrence 
that a good-faith requirement might produce." 17 
II. /d. at 443. 
12. /d. 
13. /d. at 444. 
14. /d. at 445. 
15. /d. 
16. /d. at 445-446. The Court here was referring to the fact that "[s]ignificant disincentives 
to obtaining evidence illegally-including the possibility of departmental discipline and civil 
liability-also lessen the likelihood that the ... inevitable discovery exception will promote police 
misconduct." ld at 446. 
It is interesting to note that in rejecting this call for a good faith limit on the newly adopted 
inevitable discovery exception, an exception that was certain to have a profound impact on limiting 
the exclusionary rule, the Court relies on the theory that civil liability and departmental discipline 
will serve as an effective deterrent against abusing this new exception. This is ironic in light of 
the fact that the ineffectiveness of civil liability and departmental discipline in curbing police 
misconduct was the primary reason for creation of the exclusionary rule in the first place. 
17. /d. at 446 
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III. THE PRIMARY/DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE DISTINCTION 
It is unclear if the Nix Court, in adopting the inevitable discovery 
doctrine, meant to restrict the application of that exception to derivative 
evidence only. 18 Unfortunately, nowhere in the opinion does the Court 
speak to the issue of whether the exception's scope would allow the state 
to admit primary evidence in a criminal prosecution. Largely because of 
this omission, the lower courts have been split on the issue since Nix. 
The following discussion explores the split and compares the opposing 
views. 
A. The Minority View: Limiting the Exception 
to Derivative Evidence Only 
The District of Columbia Circuit is one of the lower courts that sees 
the Nix decision as explicitly limiting the inevitable discovery doctrine to 
derivative evidence only (recall that derivative evidence is obtained indi-
rectly whereas primary evidence is obtained directly from police miscon-
duct). The D.C. Circuit explained why it believes the exception should 
not include primary evidence in the case United States v. $639,558 in 
U.S. Currency. 19 In U.S. Currency, the bag of Christopher Todd 
Bleichfeld, a man suspected of being a drug courier, was searched ille-
gally without a warrant. The bag was found to contain over $600,000, 
thought to be traceable to an illegal drug exchange. This money was pri-
mary evidence as it was a direct result of the police misconduct. At trial, 
Bleichfeld was successful in arguing that the evidence should be sup-
pressed under the exclusionary rule. On appeal, the government argued 
that the motion to suppress was incorrectly granted because, in 
Bleichfeld's situation, the government inevitably would have been legally 
empowered to search the bag without a warrant under authority of an ad-
ministrative inventory search, and thus the inevitable discovery exception 
applied. The D.C. Circuit rejected the government's argument. The court 
held that the inevitable discovery exception allows introduction of deriva-
18. Certain facts in both of Williams' Supreme Court cases indicate that the Court probably 
did not mean for the exception's scope to go beyond derivative evidence. First, the only evidence 
covered by the newly adopted exception in Nix was the location and condition of the victim's 
body. That kind of evidence is derivative in nature, as it was a byproduct of the original 
incriminating statements obtained by police misconduct. Second, those incriminating statements, 
which constituted primary evidence since they were the direct result of the misconduct, were never 
suggested as potentially permissible under the exception that the Brewer footnote foresaw. The 
footnote only indicated that the derivative evidence, the body's location and condition, would have 
been admissible in Williams' second trial. See Brewer v. William5, 430 U.S. 387,407 n.l2 (1977). 
19. 955 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
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tive evidence only. The money found by the illegal search, being primary 
evidence, was thus not covered by the exception. 
The D.C. Circuit in U.S. Currency argued that the Supreme Court 
never meant for primary evidence to be covered by the inevitable discov-
ery doctrine. The Court stated that "[t]he reasoning of Nix in support of 
the inevitable discovery exception relied heavily on the derivative nature 
of evidence, and the Supreme Court's statement about not putting the 
government in a worse position because of police misconduct was limited 
to that subject."20 To support this analysis, the D.C. Circuit focused on 
key language in Nix that was written primarily to calm fears that the inev-
itable discovery exception might be abused by clever, overzealous police. 
The court reasoned that this language, which states that there is little 
chance for abuse of the inevitable discovery doctrine because a police 
officer "will rarely if ever, be in a position to calculate whether the evi-
dence sought would be inevitably discovered,"21 only makes sense if you 
assume the Nix Court was thinking of derivative evidence, and not pri-
mary evidence. 
The following hypothetical illustrates the D.C. circuit's logic. Sup-
pose a police officer is (I) knowledgeable about his department's inven-
tory procedures, and (2) impatient to get his hands on some incriminating 
evidence. In this situation, the officer could easily calculate whether he 
could go ahead and obtain that evidence illegally without the risk of this 
primary evidence being inadmissible, because the officer would know if 
the evidence will be inevitably obtainable anyway under the inventory 
procedures. In this hypothetical, the calculation is easy because the offi-
cer is dealing with primary evidence, something immediately known and 
obtained directly after the misconduct. However, in dealing with deriva-
tive evidence, which is an unknown indirect future byproduct, it is nearly 
impossible to calculate its potential admissibility because the officer can 
neither know (1) to what end the derivative evidence will lead, nor (2) if 
there is already another line of investigation working towards that same 
end. This "impossibility of calculation" was certainly true in the Robert 
Anthony Williams cases. There, Detective Learning could not possibly 
have calculated that his Christian burial speech would obtain for him the 
condition and location of the body nor that searchers were coincidentally 
looking for the body in the same area, determinations which would both 
be necessary to conclude that the evidence would be inevitably discov-
ered and thus admissible. 
20. /d. at 720. 
21. Nix. 467 U.S. at 445. 
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In U.S. Currency, not only was the calculation quite possible, because 
the evidence at issue was primary in nature and thus amenable to that sort 
of estimation, but the calculation was in fact made by the government. 
The D.C. circuit noted that Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert Andary, who 
was called on by the officers that wanted to get into B leichfeld' s bag, 
"told the officers that a warrant was not required ... cit[ing] the eventual 
inventory of the luggage to explain why he so advised them."22 What 
better way to illustrate the D.C. Circuit's fear of the great potential for 
abuse of the inevitable discovery exception than the very facts in U.S. 
Currency, where clever and impatient officers calculated the admissibil-
ity of primary evidence to justify police misconduct. The court summed 
up its reasoning as follows: 
If the evidence stemming from the violation is nevertheless admissible 
on the basis that the bags inevitably would have been opened when they 
were inventoried, the practical consequence is apparent. In the vast run 
of cases, there would be no incentive whatever for police to go to the 
trouble of seeking a warrant (or, should we add, of waiting for a lawful 
inventory to occur during normal processing). The police could readily 
make this assessment on their own. Contrary to what Nix supposed, they 
would almost invariably be in a position to calculate whether the evi-
dence would inevitably have been discovered, because they would know 
that inventory procedures were in place?3 
The Ninth Circuit is another court which has read Nix as limiting the 
scope of the inevitable discovery doctrine to derivative evidence, and its 
recent opinion in United States v. Polanco24 is illustrative. In that case, 
Miguel Polanco was arrested and questioned by a Los Angeles Police 
Drug Squad who had caught him selling controlled substances on a street 
comer. Polanco made certain inculpatory statements during the question-
ing; however, the drug squad had neglected to read him his Miranda 
rights first. The unconstitutional inculpatory statements led police to ob-
tain Polanco's criminal record which helped them to prepare a stronger 
case against the defendant at trial. At trial the state sought to admit both 
the inculpatory statements and Polanco's criminal record. The trial judge 
allowed admission of this evidence under the inevitable discovery doc-
trine, despite Polanco's motion to suppress the evidence. On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the trial judge was in error for allowing primary 
evidence, the inculpatory statements, to be admitted in a criminal trial 
22. U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d at 718. 
23. !d. at 720-721. 
24. 93 F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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under the inevitable discovery doctrine; but it was correct in admitting 
the criminal record, since that was derivative evidence. The Ninth Circuit 
made it clear that according to its understanding of Nix, the inevitable 
discovery exception only "allows for the admission of evidence derived 
from [the] defendant's unconstitutional inculpatory statement, provided 
that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered by independent 
means," but the "doctrine does not, however, allow admission of the un-
constitutional inculpatory statement itself."25 
Though the Ninth and D.C. Circuits' reasoning in limiting the inevi-
table discovery doctrine to derivative evidence is consistent with what 
seems to be the Supreme Court's intent in Nix,26 it does not represent the 
majority view among the circuits. The D.C. Circuit admitted in U.S. Cur-
rency that "[s]everal other courts of appeal, when faced with inevitable 
discovery claims ... have either rejected or ignored any distinction be-
tween primary and derivative evidence.'m In expressing its frustration 
with those other circuits, the D.C. Circuit concluded that "[w]hatever one 
may think of the distinction, the fact remains that Nix drew it, and did so 
for the purpose of demonstrating the deterrent effects of the exclusionary 
rule would not be lessened.''28 
B. The Majority View: Applying the Exception 
to Both Primary and Derivative Evidence 
"Most of the circuits have utilized the inevitable discovery exception 
to allow the introduction of primary evidence, and this has usually been 
done without any discussion .... The court[s] [do] not discuss the appro-
priateness of the use of inevitable discovery for primary evidence; [they] 
just automatically appl[y] it.''29 Additionally, "[f]ollowing the lead of the 
circuits, states have started to apply the inevitable discovery exception to 
primary as well as secondary evidence, and generally this has also been 
done without any discussion.''30 
The Seventh Circuit, as demonstrated by its recent opinion in United 
States v. Woody, 31 is a good example of a court routinely admitting pri-
mary evidence via the inevitable discovery exception without any discus-
sion of the primary/derivative distinction often attributed to Nix. In 
Woody, Mr. Sebe Tron Woody's conviction for possessing 73 checks sto-
25. /d. at 561. 
26. See supra note 18. 
27. U.S Currency, 955 F.2d at 720. 
28. /d. 
29. Robert M. Bloom. Inevitable Discovery: An Exception Beyond the Fruits. 20 AM. J. 
CR!M. L 79. 87 (1992). 
30. !d. 
31. 55 F.3d 1257 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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len from U.S. mailboxes in the Chicago area was affirmed despite 
Woody's insistence that the trial court's refusal to suppress the checks, 
found in the glove compartment of his Datsun hatchback, was reversible 
error. Woody argued that the stolen checks were inadmissible because it 
resulted from an illegal roadside search. Note that since the checks were 
the very evidence immediately found by the alleged unlawful search, they 
were primary, rather than derivative, evidence. The Seventh Circuit 
pointed out that since Woody was driving on a suspended license and 
with no proof of insurance, the Datsun would have been inevitably im-
pounded and searched as per the Naperville Police Department's policy.: 
"Thus, even if we were to conclude that the roadside search of the locked 
glove compartment was unlawful, the police, after impounding and in the 
performance of an inventory search of the vehicle, would have discovered 
the checks, which would have been admissible against Woody under the 
inevitable discovery exception .. :m Here the Seventh Circuit used the 
inevitable discovery exception to admit primary evidence without regard 
to, or discussion of, the primary/derivative evidence distinction. 
Though most examples of appellate decisions successfully applying 
the inevitable discovery exception are cases dealing with inventory 
searches, the Eighth Circuit's United States v. Martin'' opinion shows 
how the exception can be used to admit evidence which would have inev-
itably been found under the plain view doctrine. Gary Martin was the 
subject of a "Terry stop" because he suspiciously ducked behind his 
Oldsmobile after he realized police were watching him conversing with 
two occupants of a car parked next to his car. After a brief pat down 
which revealed nothing incriminating on Martin's person, the police gave 
him permission to make a phone call in the bar with the implicit under-
standing that he would return to the parking Jot after the call to talk fur-
ther with them. While the officers stood by Martin's Oldsmobile awaiting 
his return, they used their flashlights to peer into the windows of the car 
and spotted a cellophane package of crack cocaine in the front passenger 
seat. This crack cocaine was instrumental as evidence in Martin's convic-
tion for possession of drugs. 
On appeal, Martin asserted that the trial court erred in not suppress-
ing evidence of the crack cocaine lying on the car seat. Martin argued that 
the police conduct was an unlawful premature inventory and, further, that 
the circumstances of his Terry stop, which failed to find anything incrimi-
nating on his person, could not have justified any notion that his Oldsmo-
32. !d. at 1270. 
33. 982 F.2d 1236 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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bile would have been inevitably impounded and inventoried. The Eighth 
Circuit was unpersuaded and held that: 
"[t]here is no legitimate expectation of privacy shielding that portion of 
an automobile which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either 
inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers .... Thus, even if offi-
cer Persing's inventory inspection was premature, the contraband was in 
plain view to Officer Blades from outside the car, so that seizure by him 
was inevitable and constitutionally permissible."34 
Note that this opinion, though out of the ordinary in its application of the 
inevitable discovery exception to a "plain view" set of circumstances, is 
still quite typical of the majority of courts in its routine application of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine to primary evidence without discussion of 
the Nix Court's intent to limit that exception to derivative evidence. 
In the Fifth Circuit's United States v. Seals35 opinion, the inevitable 
discovery exception was again applied to admit primary evidence. In that 
case, Joseph Noel Seals argued that his 1978 Buick was unlawfully 
searched and that therefore the fourteen plastic bags of crack cocaine 
found as a direct result should have been suppressed. The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed Seals' conviction, finding that he had been properly arrested due 
to his driving on an expired license and thus that the Buick would have 
been impounded and inventoried anyway. The circuit held that the inevi-
table discovery doctrine allowed the evidence to be used at Seals' trial 
without expressly discussing the fact that this evidence was primary evi-
dence nor expressly recognizing the primary/derivative evidence distinc-
tion. However, in Seals, the Fifth Circuit implicitly acknowledged the 
split among the circuits regarding the primary/derivative distinction when 
it stated "[t]his circuit and several other circuits recognize that evidence 
which was originally obtained improperly should not be suppressed, pro-
vided that it would have been legitimately uncovered pursuant to normal 
police practices."36 The use of the word "originally" is most appropriate 
when defining the key difference between primary and derivative evi-
dence. Evidence that is obtained originally or immediately from police 
misconduct is always primary. Evidence that is found later, thanks to the 
original evidence, is always derivative. By using the word "originally," 
the Eighth Circuit almost surely meant to denote evidence which is pri-
mary in nature. 
34. !d. at 1240 (quoting Texas v. Brown. 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983)). 
35. 987 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1993). 
36. !d. at 1108. 
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The First Circuit is another circuit in the majority view. However, the 
First Circuit differs from other circuits in that it has expressly discussed 
the primary/derivative distinction and formally rejected it before applying 
the inevitable discovery doctrine to primary evidence. In United States v. 
Zapata,37 the First Circuit, in rejecting the primary/derivative evidence 
distinction, spoke directly to the D.C. Circuit's U.S. Currency opinion, 
expressly rejecting its reasoning. In Zapata, the defendant contended that 
he had not given voluntary consent for officers to search the trunk of his 
car, which was unregistered and uninsured. Zapata argued that the evi-
dence of cocaine found in his duffel bag, in the trunk of his car, should 
have been suppressed at trial as fruit of an illegal search. Zapata further 
contended that the cocaine found could not be admitted by the inevitable 
discovery exception because the drugs were primary evidence. The prose-
cution countered that the exception should apply because Zapata's car 
was both unregistered and uninsured, inevitably subjecting it to a routine 
inventory search which would have surely discovered the duffel bag. 
In affirming Zapata's conviction, the First Circuit accepted the prose-
cution's inevitable discovery argument despite the fact that the cocaine 
was primary evidence. In speaking to the issue of the primary/derivative 
evidence distinction, the court noted that "[ w ]e decline to embrace the 
suggestion that courts should confine the inevitable discovery rule to 
cases in which the disputed evidence comprises a derivative, rather than 
primary, fruit of unlawful conduct."38 Although the Zapata court con-
ceded the fact that Nix involved only derivative evidence, it reasoned that 
the rationale behind adoption of the inevitable discovery exception, "that 
the exclusion of inevitably discovered evidence would 'put the govern-
ment in a worse position' than if no illegality had occurred, [is] fully ap-
plicable to cases involving primary evidence."39 
The First Circuit justified its rejection of the primary/derivative dis-
tinction on three main premises. First, most of the other circuits have also 
rejected the distinction. Second, the Supreme Court has had the opportu-
nity to reverse at least three of the circuits on this issue but has failed to 
do so. And finally, certain language in the Supreme Court's opinion 
United States v. Murray,40 written four years after Nix, can be interpreted 
as an endorsement of the proposition that distinguishing between primary 
and derivative evidence is irrelevant to the exclusionary rule exceptions.41 
37. 18 F.3d 971 (1st Cir. 1994). 
38. /d. at 979 n.7. 
39. /d. 
40. 487 U.S. 533 (1987). 
41. Zapata, 18 F.3d at 979 n.7. 
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C. The Murray Decision: Implied Supreme Court Confirmation of the 
Majority View? 
Before discussing Murray, it is important to point out that the deci-
sion did not deal with the inevitable discovery doctrine; it regarded only 
the independent source doctrine. However, "independent source" is very 
closely related to "inevitable discovery" because the independent source 
doctrine is the very fountain from which the inevitable discovery doctrine 
sprang. Thus, a better understanding of how to apply the independent 
source exception would arguably shed some light on how to apply the 
inevitable discovery exception. 
In Murray, the Court was faced with deciding the scope of the inde-
pendent source exception: specifically, whether it can be applied beyond 
derivative evidence to include primary evidence. Though dealing with a 
different exception, the Court was deciding the very same question of 
scope that the First and D.C. Circuits considered in their Zapata and U.S. 
Currency opinions respectively. Additionally, the forces for and against 
expanding the independent source doctrine to admit primary evidence 
raised virtually the same arguments in Murray as were advanced in the 
First and D.C. Circuits' respective debates over analogous expansion of 
the inevitable discovery doctrine. In the end, the Murray Court held in a 
plurality opinion written by Justice Scalia that applying the exception to 
include primary evidence "has better support in both precedent and pol-
icy. ,42 
The facts relied upon by the Murray Court and its reasoning in reach-
ing this conclusion are worth repeating. In 1983, federal drug enforce-
ment agents were watching Michael Murray and his cohorts near a 
Boston area warehouse with the suspicion that they were storing and dis-
tributing drugs. After they saw Murray and his associates leave the ware-
house, the agents proceeded to legally seize two vehicles just outside the 
warehouse, both of which were full of marijuana. The agents next ille-
gally entered the warehouse without a search warrant. In the warehouse 
they stumbled upon 270 burlap wrapped bales of marijuana. Recognizing 
the need for a search warrant, the officers left the warehouse and quickly 
applied for one with a local magistrate. The officers' search warrant affi-
davit did not disclose their prior illegal entry, nor did it rely on any of the 
observations the agents made during their misconduct. The warrant was 
issued some eight hours later, whereupon the officers immediately reen-
tered the warehouse and confiscated the marijuana. 
Mr. Murray contended that evidence of the 270 bales should have 
been suppressed because the bales were found as a result of police mis-
42. Murray, 487 U.S. at 537. 
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conduct. The government argued that since only the first entry was un-
lawful, and the second entry was legal, the independent source doctrine 
allows admission of the evidence gained during the second legal search 
regardless of the prior misconduct. Murray then countered that this ex-
ception, if applicable at all, could only apply to derivative evidence, and 
because the bales themselves were primary evidence, no exception to the 
exclusionary rule would work in the government's favor. The Supreme 
Court expressly rejected Murray's "position that the independent source 
doctrine does apply to independent acquisition of evidence previously 
derived indirectly from the unlawful search [derivative evidence], but 
does not apply to ... 'primary evidence,' that is, evidence acquired dur-
ing the search itself."43 Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, reasoned as 
follows: 
In addition to finding no support in our precedent ... , this strange dis-
tinction would produce results bearing no relation to the policies of the 
exclusionary rule. It would mean, for example, that the government's 
knowledge of the existence and condition of a dead body, knowledge 
lawfully acquired through independent sources, would have to be ex-
cluded if government agents had previously observed the body during 
an unlawful search of the defendant's apartment; but not if they had 
observed a notation that the body was buried in a certain location, pro-
ducing consequential discovery of the corpse.44 
Further, Justice Scalia stated that the Nix Court's adoption of the in-
evitable discovery doctrine was premised on the assumption that the inde-
pendent source doctrine's scope extends beyond derivative evidence to 
include primary evidence. In reexamining the facts that brought about 
adoption of the inevitable discovery exception in Nix, the Murray plural-
ity opinion pointed out the following: 
There, incriminating statements obtained in violation of the defendant's 
right to counsel had led police to the victim's body. The body had not in 
fact been found through an independent source as well, and so the inde-
pendent source doctrine was not itself applicable. We held, however, 
that evidence concerning the body was nonetheless admissible because a 
search had been under way which would have discovered the body, had 
it not been called off because of the discovery produced by the unlaw-
fully obtained statements .... This "inevitable discovery" doctrine obvi-
ously assumes the validity of the independent source doctrine as applied 
to evidence initially acquired unlawfully. It would make no sense to 
43. /d. at 540-41. 
44. !d. at 541 (citation omitted). 
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admit the evidence because the independent search, had it not been 
aborted, would have found the body, but to exclude the evidence if the 
search had continued and in fact found the body.45 
111 
This above-quoted reasoning, "coupled with the ... close relationship 
between the inevitable discovery doctrine and the independent source 
doctrine, has invited lower courts to utilize the Murray decision to sup-
port the use of 'inevitable discovery' to avoid exclusion of primary evi-
dence."46 The lower courts, like the First Circuit in Zapata, apply the rea-
soning of Murray by analogy to the debate over the inevitable discovery 
doctrine's primary/derivative evidence distinction. 
Of course, whether it is appropriate to apply Murray by analogy to 
the inevitable discovery doctrine is still open to debate. On one hand, it 
is well-established that the two doctrines, "independent source" and "in-
evitable discovery," are very closely related. The Nix Court noted the 
"functional similarity between these two doctrines" and concluded that 
the independent source doctrine's "rationale is wholly consistent with and 
justifies our adoption of the ultimate or inevitable discovery exception to 
the exclusionary rule."47 The rationale for both doctrines is the same: to 
prevent the exclusionary rule from putting the government in a worse po-
sition, than it would have been had no police misconduct occurred. Thus, 
if the Murray Court sees no reason to limit one of the exclusionary rule's 
exceptions to derivative evidence only, why limit another exception that 
shares the same rationale? 
Though Nix arguably set up the primary/derivative evidence distinc-
tion since its facts and analysis appear to be limited to derivative evi-
dence only, many lower courts read Murray as justifying their rejection 
of that distinction. The First Circuit in Zapata pointed out an important 
fact bolstering this logic: if the Supreme Court truly believed that certain 
lower courts had erred in applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to 
primary evidence, the Court would have overturned those circuits when it 
got the chance.48 Not only did Nix fail to correct the lower courts, but in 
citing cases for the proposition that a majority of circuits have already 
adopted the inevitable discovery exception, Nix noted three opinions that 
had actually applied that exception beyond derivative evidence to primary 
evidence.49 These facts, coupled with the similarity in purpose between 
45. !d. at 539 (emphasis added). 
46. Bloom, supra note 29, at 92-93. 
47. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). 
48. See U.S. v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 979 n.7. (1st Cir. 1994). 
49. The First Circuit pointed out "the Nix Court's approving citation to cases that had 
applied the [inevitable discovery exception] in the context of primary evidence," among which 
wereUnited States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1983), United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699 
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the inevitable discovery and independent source doctrines, present a for-
midable argument that the Murray holding for one exception could legiti-
mately be likened to the other exception. 
On the other hand, there are good arguments for the proposition that 
the two exceptions should be treated differently, regardless of the Murray 
decision, when it comes to their respective scopes. The fact remains that 
the Supreme Court has done nothing expressly to expand the inevitable 
discovery doctrine to primary evidence, whereas it has expressly ex-
panded the independent source doctrine in Murray. This may suggest that 
the two doctrines have relevant differences which justify treating them 
differently. The two doctrines do seem materially different. Independent 
source situations deal with an established historical fact, an action that 
has actually occurred, whereas inevitable discovery situations deal with 
speculation, a hypothetical event, or the possibility that something would 
have occurred. Because a supposed "inevitability" is less tangible and 
consequently not as readily provable as an independent source discovery 
that has actually occurred, it would be quite appropriate to allow the inev-
itable discovery doctrine less leeway than one would allow the independ-
ent source doctrine. In other words, because it may be easier to abuse one 
exception due to factual uncertainty, it may be wise to more stringently 
limit the scope of that exception. In essence, this is the argument raised 
by the minority of lower courts who adhere to the primary/derivative dis-
tinction despite Murray. 
IV. THE SEARCH WARRANT PROBLEM 
If the inevitable discovery exception is to be applied to the very evi-
dence obtained in an illegal search, as the previous analysis suggests that 
it might, there is a much larger problem presented in American criminal 
procedure law. Applying the inevitable discovery exception to primary 
evidence creates a great risk that the government might use the exception 
to wrongfully circumvent the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 
The government could use the exception to get around the warrant re-
quirement by arguing something similar to the following: 
We realize that we did an illegal warrantless search. However, we had 
probable cause, and we would have obtained a warrant on that basis. 
Since the warrant would have inevitably issued, and we would have 
searched pursuant to it (if we had bothered to obtain it) then all the evi-
(lOth Cir. 1982), and United States v. Roper. 681 F.2d 1354 (lith Cir. 1982) Zapata, 18 F.3d 
at 979 n.7 (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 441 n.2). 
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dence we obtained is admissible under the inevitable discovery excep-
tion. 50 
113 
The Murray decision seems to suggest that the government can legiti-
mately make this "we could have gotten a warrant" argument to circum-
vent the Fourth Amendment and take the last "logical step to eliminate 
the warrant requirement altogether."51 Whether there is merit in the "we 
could have gotten a warrant" excuse is an issue which again splits the 
courts, like the primary/derivative evidence distinction. Though some 
courts have read Nix and Murray to allow admission of evidence found in 
an illegal search, provided that the police simply could have gotten a war-
rant, most other circuits require the police to prove more before granting 
use of the inevitable discovery exception. 
A. The Pro-Prosecution View: Extreme Deference to the Police 
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Buchanan,52 demonstrated a 
relatively liberal deference to the notion that an illegal search should be 
excused because a warrant could have inevitably issued. Collin Bu-
chanan, wanted for murder in Ohio, was arrested at his Wisconsin hotel 
room after informants had tipped off the local police concerning Bu-
chanan's whereabouts and his illegal drug trade activities. Though Bu-
chanan was arrested outside, his room was searched without a warrant. 
Further, Buchanan was not read his Miranda rights. As part of the search 
of his room, the police went through Buchanan's clothing and packed it 
away in a duffel bag. While packing the bag, the officers found small 
packets of cocaine in Buchanan's clothing. 
At trial, Buchanan was unsuccessful in his motion to suppress the 
drugs and later appealed the judge's decision to admit the evidence. Be-
fore affirming Buchanan's conviction, the Seventh Circuit stated that 
"[t]he issue in this appeal is whether the cocaine discovered when Bu-
chanan's clothes were being packed would inevitably have been discov-
ered through a search pursuant to a proper warrant."53 To resolve that is-
50. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 426 
(1996). 
51. Craig M. Bradley, Murray v. United States: The Bell Tolls for the Search Warrant 
Requirement, 64 IND. L. J. 907, 920. Specifically, Professor Bradley concludes that the current 
unfortunate state of the law, post Murray, is that if the police can show "they could have gotten 
the warrant and would have been able to [search] pursuant to that warrant, as Murray held, then 
it follows, ipso facto, that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered .... Consequently, 
it is not necessary to go through the empty formality of getting a warrant to search a place that 
has already been searched." !d. 
52. 910 F.2d 1571 (7th Cir. 1990). 
53. !d. at 1573. 
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sue, the court first asked itself "two subsidiary questions: first, would the 
police have inevitably sought a search warrant for the room, and second, 
would a neutral magistrate have issued such a warrant."54 
The Buchanan court answered its first subsidiary question in the af-
firmative by simply assuming that since Buchanan was wanted for mur-
der, the police inevitably would have sought a search warrant in order to 
find the murder weapon (a gun). Though this assumption seems like the 
logical procedure police would follow, the facts of the case fail to support 
the court's assumption, instead showing that the police were more than 
willing to search Buchanan's room without a warrant. The court an-
swered the second subsidiary question affirmatively as well, based on yet 
another assumption. This second assumption was that a neutral magistrate 
would have issued a warrant to search for a gun because Buchanan's fugi-
tive status (running from murder charges in another state), coupled with 
his reputation for dealing drugs (the court noted "that guns are tools of 
the drug merchants trade"55), indicate "a fair probability that [a] gun 
would be found in the hotel room."56 Unfortunately, because the police 
never applied for the warrant before their illegal search, it remains un-
known whether the magistrate truly would have deduced that fair proba-
bility and issued a warrant accordingly. 
The assumptive hypothetical reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Bu-
chanan demonstrates the danger of applying the inevitable discovery ex-
ception to get around the need for a warrant. Arguably, the court may 
have done nothing more than attempt to insure that a guilty man not go 
unpunished merely because of police blundering. However, in a broader 
sense, the rights of innocent citizens everywhere are in greater danger of 
potential abuse by overzealous police when courts essentially emasculate 
the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment in holding the police 
merely to the extremely deferential standard of "we could have gotten a 
warrant." The Seventh Circuit is not the only court to apply the inevitable 
discovery doctrine in this frightening way; in fact, "[s]everal courts have 
relied on Nix to hold that evidence found in an illegal warrantless search 
was admissible because a warrant could and would have been ob-
tained."57 
The First Circuit is another court which has allowed the inevitable 
discovery doctrine to be triggered by a mere showing that the police 
could and would have obtained a warrant. United States v. Ford58 demon-
54. /d. 
55. /d. at 1574. 
56. /d. at 1573. 
57. SAI..TZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 50, at 426. 
58. 22 F. 3d 374 (I st Cir. 1994). 
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strates this extremely deferential reasoning quite well. In Ford, the police 
conducted a warrantless search of the three-story home of a wealthy phy-
sician, Dr. Jeffrey Ford, who had obtained illegal drugs through the mail. 
The police knew that Dr. Ford had received a mailed package containing 
cocaine because the post office had intercepted the package and tested its 
contents before returning it to the mail stream. After the police learned 
this information from the post office, they saw Dr. Ford take the package 
into his home. Rather than obtaining a warrant to search Ford's home, the 
officers knocked on his door pretending to be from the water department 
and, based on that ruse, convinced Dr. Ford to exit his home at once. 
After they got the barefoot and partially unclothed doctor outside his 
home, the police handcuffed him and informed him that he was under 
arrest. Dr. Ford was asked if he would consent to a search of his home, 
which he refused. He was then told that he would be brought before a 
magistrate but would be allowed to change his clothes first if the officers 
could accompany him to his bedroom on the middle level of his three-
story home. Ford proceeded to reenter the house with three officers fol-
lowing him, but made it clear he did not want the police opening any 
closed doors. As Dr. Ford got dressed, the police made a quick search of 
each room including all areas behind every closed door on all floors of 
the house. As a result of this illegal search, the police found the mailed 
package of cocaine as well as marijuana plants and medical instruments 
used in the drug trade. At trial, Dr. Ford was unsuccessful in his motion 
to suppress the evidence. 
On appeal, the First Circuit was presented with the issue of whether 
the trial court had been correct in admitting the evidence under the inevi-
table discovery doctrine. Dr. Ford argued that in order to use the inevita-
ble discovery doctrine in a warrantless search situation, the state must 
establish "as at least a minimum requirement, [that] the decision to seek a 
warrant [was] made prior to the time that the illegal search took place and 
that the decision was in no way influenced or accelerated by information 
gained from the illegal search."59 The circuit court flatly rejected Dr. 
Ford's argument and held that the only requirement for the government to 
use the exception to obviate the need for a warrant is that "probable cause 
be present prior to the illegal search to ensure both independence and in-
evitability for the prewarrant search situation."60 In essence, this is the 
same "could have gotten a warrant" threshold that the Seventh Circuit 
applied in Buchanan. Not surprisingly, Dr. Ford's conviction was af-
firmed when the appellate court decreed, without any significant discus-
59. /d. at 378. 
60. /d. (quoting United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (1st Cir. 1986)). 
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sion, "The existence of independent probable cause to search Dr. Ford's 
home is undisputed .... It is also beyond dispute that the seized evidence 
would have been discovered following the authorized search .... [T]hus, 
it is inevitable that the existence of probable cause would find fruition in 
the issuance of a search warrant."61 
Because the police in the two cases above never applied for a warrant 
before searching, it is difficult to call the reasoning of the First and Sev-
enth Circuits in those cases anything but mere speculation. Any law en-
forcement officer experienced in dealing with magistrates will readily 
admit that what might be considered a sufficient showing of probable 
cause is not always easily predictable and can vary greatly from one mag-
istrate to another. For the First and Seventh Circuits to affirm a convic-
tion based on their guesses as to how a hypothetical magistrate may have 
reacted to a hypothetical search warrant affidavit frustrates the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment as well as the language in Nix 
which states that the "inevitable discovery [exception] involves no specu-
lative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of 
ready verification or impeachment."62 
B. The More Demanding View: Rejection of the 
"We Could Have Gotten a Warrant" Argument 
Many of the other circuits have found the speculative reasoning 
demonstrated in Buchanan and Ford to be unacceptable in a warrantless 
search situation.63 Accordingly, these circuits represent the view that the 
"we could have gotten a warrant" argument is not sufficient to allow the 
government to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement; 
"[m]oreover, to excuse the failure to obtain a warrant merely because the 
officers had probable cause and could have inevitably obtained a warrant 
would completely obviate the warrant requirement of the fourth amend-
ment."64 Two recent cases from the Second and Ninth Circuits are among 
the best examples of rejecting of the "we could have gotten a warrant" 
excuse. 
In United States v. Mejia,65 the Ninth Circuit was presented with facts 
that the defendant, Mr. Jario A. Mejia, while being interrogated in police 
custody, admitted to the existence of counterfeit currency in his home. 
61. /d. 
62. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 n.5 (1984). 
63. In fact, in a recent opinion the Sixth Circuit rejected the reasoning in Buchanan, calling 
it "a radical departure from the Fourth Amendment requirement precedent." United States v. 
Johnson, 22 F3d 674, 684 (6th Cir. 1994). 
64. United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1280 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986). 
65. 69 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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Armed with knowledge of that admission, but without a warrant, the po-
lice proceeded to search Mejia's home, finding and seizing the counter-
feit money. This evidence was used in Mejia's trial in which he was 
charged with the crime of possession of counterfeit money. Mejia's mo-
tion to suppress the evidence was denied. Subsequently, he entered a con-
ditional guilty plea. On appeal, the government argued that the motion to 
suppress was appropriately denied and the evidence admissible under the 
inevitable discovery exception. Specifically, "[t]he government 
contend[ed] that a failure to obtain a warrant should be excused, because 
Mejia's statements while in custody gave them probable cause to search 
his home. Thus, the government argue[d], a warrant would have issued if 
the detectives had sought one."66 The court rejected the government's 
argument and stated, "This court has never applied the inevitable discov-
ery exception so as to excuse the failure to obtain a search warrant where 
the police had probable cause but simply did not attempt to obtain a war-
rant."67 The court further explained why it refuses to accept the "we could 
have got a warrant" argument, concluding as follows: 
If evidence were admitted notwithstanding the officers' unexcused fail-
ure to obtain a warrant, simply because probable cause existed, then 
there would never be any reason for officers to seek a warrant. To apply 
the inevitable discovery doctrine whenever the police could have ob-
tained a warrant but chose not to would in effect eliminate the warrant 
requirement. We are neither free nor willing to read the warrant require-
ment out of the Constitution. Accordingly, even if we assume that the 
detectives were in possession of competent evidence showing probable 
cause at the time of the search, the inevitable discovery doctrine would 
not justify introduction of the evidence seized without a warrant.6R 
In the case United States v. Cabassa,69 the Second Circuit likewise 
rejected the "we could have gotten a warrant" argument. In Cabassa, the 
government had begun preparing an application for a warrant to search 
the home of Mr. Jose M. Cabassa, a man whom they suspected was dis-
tributing cocaine from his apartment. Special agents began preparing the 
warrant application at the U.S. Attorney's office around 12:30 p.m. 
About two hours later, a team of D.E.A. agents began surrounding 
Cabassa's building in a presurveillance fashion, preparing themselves to 
serve the warrant and search as soon as they received the magistrate's 
approval. Waiting for approval apparently proved too much for the agents 
66. /d. at 319. 
67. !d. at 320. 
68. /d. 
69. 62 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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to bear, they decided to enter Cabassa's apartment without the warrant. 70 
The agents then forced their way into Cabassa' s apartment, handcuffed 
him, and searched the place, finding drugs and weapons. When the Assis-
tant U.S. Attorneys learned of the search, they ceased working on the 
warrant application. Consequently, no warrant was ever presented to the 
magistrate. Cabassa moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result 
of the warrantless search. However, the trial judge concluded that the evi-
dence was admissible under the inevitable discovery exception. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the suppression motion. The 
government contended that the trial judge was correct in admitting the 
evidence because "it was in the 'final stages' of obtaining a warrant when 
the illegal search occurred and ... a magistrate would certainly have is-
sued a warrant based on the information that was to be included in the 
warrant application."71 In rejecting the government's assumption, the cir-
cuit court pointed out that because the government never actually re-
ceived a warrant from the magistrate, it would be extremely difficult to 
overcome certain concerns which lie as obstacles to the proposition that 
the police had done enough to trigger the inevitable discovery exception. 
One such concern, specific to the scenario presented in Cabassa, was that 
"[i]f the process of obtaining a search warrant has barely begun, ... the 
inevitability of discovery is lessened by the probability, under all the cir-
cumstances of the case, that the evidence in question would no longer 
have been at the location of the illegal search when the warrant actually 
issued.'m In fact, the reason why the police had jumped the gun and pre-
maturely searched in this case stemmed from the concern that the evi-
dence might be moved to another location if they waited any longer for 
the warrant to issue. 
Perhaps the biggest concern the Second Circuit had about accepting 
the government's "we would have gotten a warrant" argument is the "re-
sidual possibility that a magistrate judge would have required a stronger 
showing of probable cause.'m The court specifically explained what it 
meant by the "residual possibility" problem and concluded as follows: 
At best, the government's showing in the instant matter would support 
separate findings that more probably than not a warrant would eventu-
ally have issued and that more probably than not the evidence would 
70. Apparently the decision to jump the gun and enter the apartment early stemmed from 
a concern among the D.E.A. agents that Cabassa might become aware of their presence in his 
neighborhood "because the agents were 'white people' who might 'stick out like a sore thumb.' " 
/d. at 472. 
71. /d. at 473. 
72. /d. 
73. /d. at 474. 
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have been in the apartment when a lawful search occurred. Either of 
these findings is susceptible to factual error-the magistrate judge 
might not be satisfied as to the showing of probable cause or, more 
likely, the evidence might disappear before issuance or execution of a 
warrant, or both-and the combined chance of error undermines the 
conclusion that discovery of the evidence pursuant to a lawful search 
was inevitable . 
. . . [For example, t]o say that more probably than not event 'X' 
would have occurred is to say only that there is a 50%+ chance that 'X' 
would have occurred. Clearly, the doctrine of inevitable discovery re-
quires something more where the discovery is based upon the expected 
issuance of a warrant. Otherwise, it would result in illegally seized evi-
dence being received when there was a 49% chance that a warrant 
would not have issued or would not have issued in a timely fashion, 
hardly a showing of inevitability.74 
V. THE ACTIVE PURSUIT RULE 
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The biggest danger in applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to 
primary evidence75 is the potential this has on emasculating the search 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.76 In an attempt to solve 
this concern, some courts have imposed the following requirement: in 
order to invoke the inevitable discovery exception, "the prosecution must 
demonstrate that the lawful means which made discovery inevitable ... 
were being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal con-
duct."77 This requirement is called the active pursuit rule. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has never expressly decided whether or not to adopt an ac-
tive pursuit rule. Accordingly, the lower courts, as with the primary evi-
dence and search warrant issues discussed above, are split over whether 
to adopt an active pursuit rule. The following comments explore and ana-
lyze the opposing views on the issue. 
A. Circuits Adopting the Active Pursuit Rule 
The Eleventh Circuit is one of the lower courts which routinely re-
quires that the active pursuit rule be satisfied before the government can 
use the inevitable discovery exception. The Eleventh Circuit demon-
strated this requirement in United States v. Satterfi.eld.78 In that case, Mr. 
Edward Eugene Satterfield, a/k/a "Pig" Satterfield, appealed his convic-
tion for kidnapping Mrs. Pauline Callaway. With the aid of his shotgun, 
74. /d. 
75. See supra Part III. 
76. See supra Part IV. 
77. United States v. Brooking, 614 F.2d 1037, 1042 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980). 
78. 743 F.2d 827 (lith Cir. 1984). 
120 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 13 
"Pig" Satterfield had forcibly taken Mrs. Callaway from her home in 
Georgia, transported her across the state line, and held her against her 
will at his residence in Alabama. Mrs. Callaway managed to escape from 
Satterfield's house to a neighbor's house and called the local police for 
help. After seeing to Mrs. Callaway's health and safety, three Alabama 
police officers "[w]ithout an arrest warrant or search warrant ... knocked 
on Satterfield's front door, announced their presence and receiving no 
response, entered the house using a flashlight for illumination ."79 
Satterfield was found in the house, arrested, and taken to be secured in 
the back of a patrol car parked outside. "After the deputies took 
Satterfield to [the patrol car], they continued to search the [house] for 
nearly ten minutes and found the shotgun underneath the cushions of a 
sofa in the room adjoining the bedroom."80 
Before trial, Satterfield moved to suppress the shotgun, contending 
that the exclusionary rule precluded its admission because it was the fruit 
of an illegal search. The trial court denied the motion, and the Eleventh 
Circuit was presented with the issue of whether that denial was appropri-
ate. The government asserted that the trial judge properly admitted the 
shotgun under the inevitable discovery exception. Specifically, the gov-
ernment explained "that the shotgun would have been found in any event 
because the police obtained a valid warrant for the search of Satterfield's 
residence several hours after the illegal search was made .... [, and] the 
police undoubtedly would have uncovered the weapon during their search 
with the warrant."81 
However, the circuit court held that before the inevitable discovery 
exception can be invoked, two elements must be met: "[First,] there must 
be a reasonable probability that the evidence in question would have been 
discovered by lawful means, and [second,] the prosecution must demon-
strate that the lawful means which made discovery inevitable were pos-
sessed by the police and were being actively pursued prior to the occur-
rence of the illegal conduct."82 This second element is the active pursuit 
rule. The court found that it was not satisfied because "the government 
had not yet initiated the lawful means that would have led to the discov-
ery of the shotgun."83 Accordingly, the court held that the inevitable dis-
covery exception could not have been invoked and the shotgun should not 
have been admitted. Though the result of this decision clearly worked to 
the advantage of the criminal, "Pig" Satterfield, and certainly many other 
79. !d. at 832. 
80. !d. 
81. !d. at 845. 
82. !d. at 846. 
83. !d. 
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less demanding circuits would not have found the district court in error, 
the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless vehemently defended the active pursuit 
rule and concluded its discussion on the matter as follows: 
This is a sound rule, especially when applied to a case in which a search 
warrant was constitutionally required. Because a valid search warrant 
nearly always can be obtained after the search has occurred, a contrary 
holding would practically destroy the requirement that a warrant for the 
search of a home be obtained before the search takes place. [Were it 
otherwise, o]ur constitutionally-mandated preference for substituting the 
judgment of a detached magistrate for that of a searching officer would 
be greatly undermined.84 
The Fifth Circuit, likewise, applies the active pursuit rule. In its 
United States v. Cherry85 opinion, it reviewed the conviction of U. S. 
Army Private James Thomas Cherry who was charged with murdering a 
taxicab driver. The conviction was attributable to the admission of 
Cherry's pistol and bullets which were found behind a removable ceiling 
panel in his barracks. Cherry had disclosed the location of this evidence 
in a confession to FBI agents on the afternoon of December 8, 1982, but 
moved before trial that it be suppressed because the confession had been 
obtained illegally in violation of his Miranda rights. Although the trial 
court agreed that the confession had been gained in violation of Miranda, 
it nevertheless denied the motion and allowed admission of the evidence 
under the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
Specifically, the trial court reasoned that the inevitable discovery 
doctrine applied because by the afternoon of December 8, 1982, the FBI 
agents had already discovered by independent legal means the following 
relevant information: (1) Cherry's military identification and driver's li-
cense were left in the victim's taxicab; (2) the cab's final dispatch had 
been to Cherry's barracks; (3) the victim's wallet had been found in a 
trash can in Cherry's barracks' latrine; (4) members of Cherry's unit had 
seen him recently in possession of the same type of weapon which caused 
the victim's death; and (5) FBI agents had observed a dusty footprint on 
top of a dresser in Cherry's barracks which pointed towards the ceiling 
panel behind which the gun and bullets were hiding. The trial court be-
lieved that these five discoveries provided the FBI agents, as of the after-
noon of December 8, "more than enough probable cause to obtain a 
search warrant for the Defendant's specific area of the barracks building, 
and they had good and sufficient reason to make a specific search of the 
84. /d. (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 568 ( 1976)). 
85. 759 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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false ceiling where the gun was found. [Thus, t]he ultimate discovery of 
the pistol was inevitable."86 
The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court on this issue and repri-
manded it for failing to require proof of the active pursuit rule before in-
voking the inevitable discovery exception. The court reminded all con-
cerned that in the Fifth Circuit the inevitable discovery exception requires 
not only a reasonable probability that the evidence would have been dis-
covered by an independent means, but also proof that police were ac-
tively pursuing those means before any misconduct occurred. The court 
pointed out that in the case at bar, "[n]o finding was made ... that the 
agents were actively pursuing a warranted means of searching the ceiling 
at the time" the Miranda violation occurred.87 In fact, there was "uncon-
tradicted testimony" that at time the FBI searched the location in the ceil-
ing which Cherry divulged in his confession, "the agents had not even 
begun ... drafting an affidavit [for] procurement of a warrant. Thus, be-
cause at the time of the warrantless search the agents could have obtained 
a warrant but made no effort to do so, ... the district court erred in hold-
ing the evidence admissible under the inevitable discovery exception."88 
The ruling in Cherry seems quite harsh to law enforcement, espe-
cially in light of the likelihood that the five discoveries found by legal, 
independent means would have been more than adequate for a showing of 
probable cause to issue a warrant. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit was 
more concerned with the danger of encouraging illegal conduct had it 
allowed the government to use evidence illegally obtained when it very 
easily could have secured a warrant. This danger was discussed in greater 
detail in Cherry as follows: 
when the police have not been in active pursuit of an alternate line of 
investigation that is at a minimum supportable by leads, the general ap-
plication of the inevitable discovery exception would greatly encourage 
the police to engage in illegal conduct because ( 1) the police would usu-
ally be less certain that the discovery of the evidence is "inevitable" in 
the absence of the illegal conduct and (2) the danger that the evidence 
illegally obtained may be inadmissible would be reduced. While sup-
pression in such a case may put the prosecution in a worse position be-
cause of the police misconduct, a contrary result would cause the inevi-
table discovery exception to swallow the rule by allowing evidence oth-
erwise tainted to be admitted merely because the police could have cho-
sen to act differently and obtain the evidence by legal means. When the 
86. /d. at 1202. 
87. /d. at 1206. 
88. /d. 
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police forego legal means of investigation simply in order to obtain evi-
dence in violation of a suspect's constitutional rights, the need to deter 
is paramount and requires application of the exclusionary rule.s9 
123 
Finally, in order to put to rest any doubt whether the Supreme Court's 
decision Nix v. Williams (which at the time of the Cherry decision was a 
very recent opinion) was consistent with requiring a showing of active 
pursuit before allowing use of the inevitable discovery exception, the 
Cherry court made the following finding: 
We find the [active pursuit rule] to be fully consistent with Nix v. Wil-
liams. In [Nix], the search was already underway in the general vicinity 
where the body was found when the police initiated the illegal interroga-
tion. At the time of the police misconduct, therefore, the authorities 
were both actively pursuing the alternative line of investigation and in 
possession of a number of leads. As the Supreme Court noted, exclud-
ing the evidence under these circumstances would (1) put the prosecu-
tion in a worse position than it would have been in but for the police 
misconduct and (2) fail to be a significant deterrent since, if in the fu-
ture the police are in a position to detennine that the discovery of the 
evidence through independent means is imminent and inevitable, "there 
will be little to gain from taking any dubious 'shortcuts."'90 
B. Circuits Rejecting the Active Pursuit Rule 
In United States v. Kennedy,91 the first case in which the Sixth Circuit 
directly addressed the issue of whether to adopt an active pursuit prereq-
uisite for application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, 92 the court 
firmly decided against it. In that case, due to a simple clerical error, Mr. 
Arre Kennedy's black suitcase was misdirected to the Washington D.C. 
airport from its intended Miami destination. Because the suitcase went 
unclaimed and had a strong suspicious odor, the Washington police felt 
as though they should open it. The police found over seventeen kilograms 
of cocaine in the suitcase. However, because the bag was opened without 
a warrant, Mr. Kennedy moved at trial to suppress the cocaine as fruit of 
police misconduct. The district court denied the motion, and Kennedy 
appealed. 
There were no facts to indicate that the police were actively pursuing 
an application for a warrant before the misconduct took place. Conse-
quently, if the Sixth Circuit had decided to adopt the active pursuit rule, 
89. /d. at 1204-1205. 
90. /d. at 1204 (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 446). 
91. 61 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1995). 
92. See id. at 498. ("Although this court has considered this issued at least twice, it has 
never addressed it directly." /d.). 
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Kennedy's conviction would certainly have been overturned. However, 
the Sixth Circuit decided to be less demanding of the prosecution than 
some other circuits and held "that an alternate, independent line of inves-
tigation [active pursuit] is not required for the inevitable discovery excep-
tion to apply."93 
The court came to this conclusion based on its understanding of the 
Supreme Court's Murray decision. According to the Kennedy court, 
"Murray held that the Fourth Amendment does not require suppression of 
evidence initially discovered during a police officer's illegal search if that 
evidence is also discovered during a later search pursuant to a valid war-
rant that was obtained independently of the illegal search."94 Recall that 
the officers in Murray did not begin working to obtain a search warrant 
until after the police misconduct in that case had already occurred. Thus, 
Murray seems to suggest that there is no active pursuit requirement. 
Though this may be a logical assumption to read into Murray, it is most 
important to point out, again, that Murray only dealt with the independent 
source doctrine; to read Murray as rejecting the active pursuit rule in the 
context of the inevitable discovery doctrine, as the Sixth Circuit did in 
Kennedy, one must apply its reasoning by analogy.95 
In United States v. Ford, 96 the First Circuit likewise rejected the ac-
tive pursuit rule. The facts of Ford are explained in detail in Part IV.A. 
above, but an important detail to reexamine here is that the defendant, Dr. 
Jeffrey Ford, argued for a minimum prerequisite to application of the in-
evitable discovery exception--proof at least that "the decision to seek a 
warrant [was] made prior to the time that the illegal search took place and 
that the decision in no way [was] influenced or accelerated by informa-
tion gained from the illegal search."97 In effect, Dr. Ford argued for an 
active pursuit requirement. In fact, the First Circuit realized as much and 
likened his argument to that of a previously heard "defendant [who] cited 
for support a Fifth Circuit decision which held that the legal process of 
discovery be ongoing at the time of the illegal discovery in order for the 
inevitable discovery exception to be applicable."98 The First Circuit ex-
pressly responded to Dr. Ford's call for the active pursuit rule as follows: 
This court decline[s] to adopt such a strict approach. Rather than setting 
up an inflexible [sic] "ongoing" test such as the Fifth Circuit's, we sug-
gest that the analysis focus on the questions of independence and inevi-
93. /d. at 499-500. 
94. /d. at 499 n.2. 
95. See supra Part III.C. 
96. 22 F.3d 374 (1st Cir. 1994). 
97. /d. at 378. 
98. /d. at 377 (quoting United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1196 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
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tability and remain flexible enough to handle many different fact pat-
terns which will be presented .... In cases where a warrant is obtained, 
however, the active pursuit requirement is too rigid. On the other hand, 
a requirement that probable cause be present prior to the illegal search 




The split in the circuits over (1) the primary/derivative evidence 
distinction, (2) the "we could have gotten a warrant" excuse, and (3) the 
active pursuit rule creates confusion and injustice in American criminal 
procedure law. Because the lower courts are divided on these issues, 
criminal defendants receive vastly different results in very similar trials 
depending on which circuit they are prosecuted in. Accordingly, there is a 
real need for the Supreme Court to establish uniformity among the lower 
courts regarding the application and scope of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine. The Supreme Court has heretofore failed to specifically delimit 
the scope of the inevitable discovery doctrine. As the Satterfield court 
stated, "Except for the application of its rule to the specific facts before 
the Court and its holding that the Government must establish the inevita-
bility of discovery by a preponderance of the evidence, the Supreme 
Court was silent [in Nix] as to what constitutes an 'inevitable' discovery 
under the doctrine." 100 
In order to overcome the ambiguity of Nix and establish much-needed 
uniformity among the lower courts, the Supreme Court has two options in 
light of its Murray decision. The first is to treat the scope of the inevita-
ble discovery doctrine like it has the independent source doctrine. By 
analogy, then, the proper scope of one exception would define the proper 
scope of the other. As this comment has pointed out, many of the lower 
courts have already made this analogy, believing it to be what the dictum 
in Murray intended. The problem with this approach is that it does not 
take into account the relevant differences between an "inevitable discov-
ery" and an "independent source." In fact, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
dissented in Nix because he realized just how very relevant those differ-
ences are. Marshall underscored this distinction when he stated: 
The "inevitable discovery" exception ... differs in one key respect from 
its next of kin: specifically, the evidence sought to be introduced at trial 
has not actually been obtained from an independent source, but rather 
99. /d. (quoting United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (1st Cir. 1986) (second 
alteration in original). 
100. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (lith Cir. 1984). 
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would have been discovered as a matter of course if independent inves-
tigations were allowed to proceed . 
. . . The inevitable discovery exception necessarily implicates a hy-
pothetical finding that differs in kind from the factual finding that pre-
cedes application of the independent source rule. 101 
Keeping Justice Marshall's concern in mind, the better option for the 
Court to follow entails true recognition qf what makes the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine different, its speculative or hypothetical nature. Because 
of this distinctive feature, applying the inevitable discovery doctrine 
without some specially tailored limitations creates the danger of encour-
aging police misconduct by allowing admission of illegally obtained evi-
dence despite the fact that the police should have procured a search war-
rant. Countenancing such a danger violates the very principles that under-
lie the Fourth Amendment. In order to effectively mitigate against this 
danger, the Supreme Court should limit the inevitable discovery doctrine 
either by narrowing its scope to admit derivative evidence only or by re-
quiring the active pursuit rule. 
Based on the previous analysis in this comment, the best boundary is 
adoption of the D.C. and Ninth Circuits' reasoning which limits the doc-
trine to derivative evidence only. This approach is the most effective 
method of protecting against the danger of encouraging the government 
to violate principles of the Fourth Amendment. However, if the Supreme 
Court would be unwilling to adopt this minority position, the next best 
limit would be adoption of the active pursuit rule. Though a bit less effec-
tive in mitigating against the constitutional concerns, the active pursuit 
rule would at least provide greater protection than the injustice and con-
fusion that results from the current split in the courts. 
Troy E. Golden 
101. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 459 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
